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Modeling Social Heterogeneity with Genetic Programming in an Artificial Double Auction Market

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Genetic Programming (EuroGP 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5481))

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Abstract

Individual differences in intellectual abilities can be observed across time and everywhere in the world, and this fact has been well studied by psychologists for a long time. To capture the innate heterogeneity of human intellectual abilities, this paper employs genetic programming as the algorithm of the learning agents, and then proposes the possibility of using population size as a proxy parameter of individual intelligence. By modeling individual intelligence in this way, we demonstrate not only a nearly positive relation between individual intelligence and performance, but more interestingly the effect of decreasing marginal contribution of IQ to performance found in psychological literature.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. AI-ECON Research Center, Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

    Shu-Heng Chen & Chung-Ching Tai

Authors
  1. Shu-Heng Chen
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  2. Chung-Ching Tai
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Informatics, Systems and Communication (D.I.S.Co.), University of Milano-Bicocca, viale Sarca 336-U14, 20126, Milano, Italy

    Leonardo Vanneschi

  2. GE Global Research, NY 12309, Niskayuna, USA

    Steven Gustafson

  3. Department of Computer Engineering, University of Coimbra, Polo II - Pinhal de Marrocos, 3030, Coimbra, Portugal

    Alberto Moraglio

  4. Institute of High Performance Computing and Networking, National Research Council of Italy (ICAR - CNR), Via P. Castellino 111, 80131, Napoli, Italy

    Ivanoe De Falco

  5. Wilhelm Schickard Institut für Informatik, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Abt. Rechnerarchitektur, Sand 1, 72076, Tübingen, Germany

    Marc Ebner

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, SH., Tai, CC. (2009). Modeling Social Heterogeneity with Genetic Programming in an Artificial Double Auction Market. In: Vanneschi, L., Gustafson, S., Moraglio, A., De Falco, I., Ebner, M. (eds) Genetic Programming. EuroGP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5481. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01181-8_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01181-8_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01180-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01181-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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