Skip to main content

Relative Fitness and Absolute Fitness for Co-evolutionary Systems

  • Conference paper
Book cover Genetic Programming (EuroGP 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3447))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 911 Accesses

Abstract

The commonly adopted fitness which evaluates the performance of individuals in co-evolutionary systems is the relative fitness. The relative fitness measure is a dynamic assessment subject to co-evolving population(s). Researchers apparently pay little attention to the use of absolute fitness functions in studying co-evolutionary algorithms. The first aim of this work is to define both the relative fitness and the absolute fitness for co-evolving systems. Another aim is to demonstrate the usage of the absolute and relative fitness through two case studies. One is for the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Another case is for solving the Basic Alternating-Offers Bargaining Problem, for which a co-evolutionary system has been developed by means of Genetic Programming. Experiments using the relative fitness function have discovered co-adapted strategies that converge to nearly game-theoretic solutions. This finding suggests that the relative fitness essentially drives co-evolution to perfect equilibrium. On the other hand, the absolute fitness measuring co-evolving populations monitors the development of co-adaptation. Having analyzed the micro-behavior of the players’ strategies based on their absolute fitness, we can explain how co-evolving populations stabilize at the perfect equilibrium.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Axelrod, R.: The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In: Davis, L. (ed.) Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bierman, H., Fernandes, L.: Game Theory with Economic Applications. Addison-Wesley, New York (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Darwen, P., Yao, X.: On evolving robust strategies for iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In: Yao, X. (ed.) AI-WS 1993 and 1994. LNCS, vol. 956. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Jin, N., Tsang, E.: Using Evolutionary Algorithms to study Bargaining Problems. In: IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games (2005) (to appear)

    Google Scholar 

  5. de Jong, E., Pollack, J.: Ideal Evaluation from Coevolution. Evolutionary Computation 12(2) (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Holland, J.: Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Koza, J.: Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1992)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Luke, S., Wiegand, P.R.: Guaranteeing Coevolutionary Objective Measures. In: Foundations of Genetic Algorithms VII. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Miller, J.: The Co-evolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29(1) (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Schmitt, L.M.: Classification with Scaled Genetic Algorithms in a Coevolutionary Setting. GECCO (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Simon, H.: A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69(1) (1955)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Rand, D.: The course note of BIO48. Brown University (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Rubinstein, A.: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50, 97–110 (1982)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Jin, N., Tsang, E. (2005). Relative Fitness and Absolute Fitness for Co-evolutionary Systems. In: Keijzer, M., Tettamanzi, A., Collet, P., van Hemert, J., Tomassini, M. (eds) Genetic Programming. EuroGP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3447. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31989-4_30

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31989-4_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-25436-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31989-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics