Generalized Divide the Dollar
Created by W.Langdon from
gp-bibliography.bib Revision:1.8081
- @InProceedings{Ashlock:2016:CECa,
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author = "Daniel Ashlock and Garrison Greenwood",
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title = "Generalized Divide the Dollar",
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booktitle = "Proceedings of 2016 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary
Computation (CEC 2016)",
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year = "2016",
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editor = "Yew-Soon Ong",
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pages = "343--350",
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address = "Vancouver",
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month = "24-29 " # jul,
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publisher = "IEEE Press",
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keywords = "genetic algorithms, genetic programming, FSM",
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isbn13 = "978-1-5090-0623-6",
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DOI = "doi:10.1109/CEC.2016.7743814",
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size = "8 pages",
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abstract = "Divide the dollar is a two-player simultaneous derived
from a game invented by John Nash because its strategy
space has an entire subspace of Nash equilibria. This
study describes and explores a family of
generalizations of divide the dollar with easily
controlled properties. If we view divide the dollar as
modelling the process of making a bargain, then the
generalized game makes it easy to model the impact of
external subsidies on bargaining. Classical divide the
dollar is compared to four generalizations representing
a simple subsidy in three different amounts and a more
complex type of subsidy. The distribution of simple
strategies that arise under replicator dynamics is
compared to the bids that arise in populations of
evolving, adaptive agents. Agents are encoded using a
finite state representation that conditions its
transitions on the result of bargains. These results
fall into three categories, the first player obtains a
higher amount, the second one does, or the agents fail
to make a deal. The replicator dynamic results are
compared to obtain the naive degree of distortion
caused by the subsidies. The results for evolving
agents are then examined to figure out the degree to
which adaptation compensated for or amplifies this
distortion.",
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notes = "WCCI2016",
- }
Genetic Programming entries for
Daniel Ashlock
Garrison W Greenwood
Citations