The Effect of Splitting Populations on Bidding Strategies

Created by W.Langdon from gp-bibliography.bib Revision:1.7630

@InProceedings{ashlock:1997:spbs,

• author = "Dan Ashlock and Charles Richter",
• title = "The Effect of Splitting Populations on Bidding Strategies",
• booktitle = "Genetic Programming 1997: Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference",
• editor = "John R. Koza and Kalyanmoy Deb and Marco Dorigo and David B. Fogel and Max Garzon and Hitoshi Iba and Rick L. Riolo",
• year = "1997",
• month = "13-16 " # jul,
• keywords = "genetic algorithms, genetic programming",
• pages = "27--34",
• address = "Stanford University, CA, USA",
• publisher_address = "San Francisco, CA, USA",
• publisher = "Morgan Kaufmann",
• URL = "http://dakotarichter.com/papers/AshlockRichterSplittingPopulationsGP97.pdf",
• URL = "http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/W.Langdon/ftp/papers/gp1997/ashlock_1997_spbs.pdf",
• size = "8 pages",
• abstract = "In this paper we explore the effects of splitting a single population of artificial agents engaging in a simple double auction game into two competing populations by modifying experiments reported in [Ashlock, 1997]. The original paper used a new genetic programming tool, termed GP-Automata, to induce bidding strategies with a genetic algorithm for Nash's game divide the dollar. The motivation for performing the research is the biological notion of inclusive fitness and kinship theory. The a priori hypothesis of the authors was that behaviour of the agents in the simulated market would change substantially when they were no longer forced to be similar to one another by the genetic mechanism used to induce new bidding strategies. While breeding takes place only within each population, all bidding is between agents from different populations. The agents in the original (single population) paper strongly favoured {"}fair{"} Nash equilibria of the divide the dollar game, at odds with the economic theory for egoistic agents. When controls for kinship effects are implemented by splitting the population a substantial effect is observed. When agents doing the bidding are not close genetic kin to one another the 'unfair' Nash equilbria regain a great deal of their former prominence. This result is of importance to any sort of evolutionary algorithm creating artificial agents, as kinship theory can confound game-theoretic predictions that assume egoistic agents. The current research also arguably increases the level of realism in the simulation of a double auction market.",
• notes = "GP-97",

}

Genetic Programming entries for Daniel Ashlock Charles W Richter Jr

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