abstract = "Bargaining is fundamental in social activities.
Game-theoretic methodology has provided theoretic
solutions for certain abstract models. Even for a
simple model, this method demands substantial human
intelligent effort in order to solve game-theoretic
equilibriums. The analytic complexity increases rapidly
when more elements are included in the models. In our
previous work, we have demonstrated how coevolutionary
algorithms can be used to find approximations to
game-theoretic equilibriums of bargaining models that
consider bargaining costs only. In this paper, we study
more complicated bargaining models, in which outside
option is taken into account besides bargaining cost.
Empirical studies demonstrate that evolutionary
algorithms are efficient in finding near-perfect
solutions. Experimental results reflect the compound
effects of discount factors and outside options upon
bargaining outcomes. We argue that evolutionary
algorithm is a practical tool for generating reasonably
good strategies for complicated bargaining models
beyond the capability of game theory.",
notes = "WCCI 2006 - A joint meeting of the IEEE, the EPS, and
the IEE.