abstract = "A large series of studies on evolving agents to play
mathematical games has demonstrated that many factors
can significantly impact which agents arise, when those
agents arise during evolution, and how robust they are
in their play against other agents. Some or all of
these factors have been shown to be relevant in the
iterated prisoner's dilemma, the snowdrift game, and a
fairly complex game called divide-the-dollar. This
study demonstrates the impact or representation and
agent resource allocation for a new game called
coordination prisoner's dilemma. This work demonstrates
protocols from a recently published book for analysis
of agent behavior and extends the work to another game,
the first three-move game so treated. A new
representation for agents playing mathematical games is
introduced, a linear genetic programming register
machine. New metrics for agent behavior including total
exploitation, strategic variability, and action entropy
are introduced. It is found that varying the
representation and resource levels within a
representation changes the types of game playing agents
produced by evolution for coordination prisoner's
dilemma.",
notes = "Korean Research Institute for Bioscience and
Biotechnology, Daejeon 306-809, South Korea