Co-evolution of auction mechanisms and strategies: Towards a novel approach to microeconomic design

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@TechReport{oai:CiteSeerPSU:531021,

• title = "Co-evolution of auction mechanisms and strategies: Towards a novel approach to microeconomic design",
• author = "Steve Phelps and Simon Parsons and Peter McBurney and Elizabeth Sklar",
• institution = "Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool",
• year = "2002",
• number = "ULCS-02-004",
• address = "UK",
• keywords = "genetic algorithms, genetic programming, Auction mechanisms, Evolutionary computation, Market design, Multi-agent systems (MAS), Resource allocation, Trading strategies",
• citeseer-isreferencedby = "oai:CiteSeerPSU:86458",
• annote = "The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeer Archives",
• language = "en",
• oai = "oai:CiteSeerPSU:531021",
• rights = "unrestricted",
• URL = "http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/techreports/tr2002/tr02004abs.html",
• URL = "http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/techreports/tr2002/ulcs-02-004.ps",
• URL = "http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/531021.html",
• abstract = "Mechanism design is the economic theory of the design of effective resource allocation mechanisms, such as auctions. Traditionally, economists have approached design problems by studying the analytic properties of different mechanisms. An alternative is to view a mechanism as the outcome of some evolutionary process involving buyers, sellers and the auctioneer. As a first step in this alternative direction, we have applied genetic programming to the development of an auction pricing rule for double auctions in a wholesale electricity marketplace. For this purpose we adopted the multi-agent simulation model of Nicolaisen, Petrov and Tesfatsion.",
• notes = "ECOMAS???",
• size = "8 pages",

}

Genetic Programming entries for Steve Phelps Simon Parsons Peter McBurney Elizabeth Sklar

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